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I. INTRODUCTION
As the war on drugs continues,1 the states have begun to supple-
ment their prosecutorial arsenal. In addition to tougher criminal
sentences, 2 drug tax assessments increasingly await those convicted
Copyright held by the NEBRAsKA LAW REviuw.
1. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the
War on Drugs, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1389, 1391 (1993)("[Tlhe change of party control of
the White House [from Republican to Democrat] seems to have had little effect on
the prosecution of the drug war.").
2. See, e.g., William Booth, War on Drugs Keeps Prisons Crowded: Mandatory
Sentences Put Nonviolent Offenders Behind Bars While Killers Go Free, S.F.
CHRoN., July 8, 1993, at A5.
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of drug offenses.3 This civil method for deterring the possession of il-
licit narcotics complements the criminal law by allowing the state to
impose both a criminal sentence and a punitive tax assessment for the
same offense. The United States Supreme Court dealt a severe blow
to such tactics in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch.4 In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that a Montana drug tax proceeding could not
follow a criminal conviction without implicating the Fifth Amendment
protection against double jeopardy.5
This Note analyzes the impact Kurth Ranch will have upon the
taxation of illicit drugs. First, a survey of specific-model drug taxation
statutes will be provided. Second, this Note will discuss Supreme
Court double jeopardy jurisprudence prior to Kurth Ranch. Third, the
Court's opinion and holding in Kurth Ranch will be outlined with par-
ticular emphasis on Nebraska's Marijuana and Controlled Substances
Tax. The Note concludes with a discussion of the administrative and
legislative remedies that remain available for taxing illicit drugs after
Kurth Ranch.
II. STATE DRUG TAX STATUTES
Although the federal government taxed marijuana over half a cen-
tury ago,6 the states have begun to levy taxes on illicit dfugs only
within the last twelve years.7 States currently employ two methods to
tax the sale of controlled substances.8 A majority of the states use a
3. Twenty-six states now have drug tax statutes. They are Alabama, Arizona, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Loui-
siana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah
and Wisconsin.
4. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
5. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that, "[Nlor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 stat. 551 (repealed 1970). Repeal of the
Act was forced by the Supreme Court's decision in Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969). The Act was held to create a "'real and appreciable' risk of self-
incrimination" because information provided by persons paying the tax could be
made available to law enforcement authorities. Id. at 16. Contemporary drug
tax statutes typically pass the self-incrimination hurdle by providing for confi-
dentiality provisions within the statutory scheme. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-
4315 (Supp. 1993)(detailing that information provided by the taxpayer "shall not
be used against the dealer in any criminal proceeding, unless independently ob-
tained"). The Nebraska statute was held not to violate the guarantee against
self-incrimination in State v. Garza, 242 Neb. 573, 496 N.W.2d 448 (1993).
7. A 1983 Arizona statute was the first to require dealers to purchase tax stamps.
Christina Joyce, Expanding the War Against Drugs: Taxing Marijuana and Con-
trolled Substances, 12 H iNE J. PuB. L. & POLY 231 (1991).
8. Alan D. Gould, Criminal Law and the Fifth Amendment: Taxation of Illegal
Drugs, 1989 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 541, 542 (1991).
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specific-model of drug taxation that sets forth taxes applicable only to
illicit drugs.9 These laws are excise taxeslO much like those imposed
upon cigarettes or alcohol. Most often, the statutes require persons
subject to the tax to purchase drug tax stamps or certificates which
are to be affixed to the contraband."1 Some states use a generalized
approach and tax narcotics under existing income or sales tax
provisions.12
9. See ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-1 to -16 (1993); Am. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1201 to -
1218 (1991 & Supp. 1994); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-28.7-101 to -109 (Brad-
ford 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-650 to -664 (West 1993); FIA. STAT.
ANN. § 212.0505 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-15-1 to -11
(Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 63-4201 to -4211 (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 35, para. 520/1-520/26 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-
7-3-1 to -17 (Burns Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE. ANN. §§ 453B.1-.16 (West Supp.
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5201 to -5211 (1989 & Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 47:2601 to :2610 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 4433-
4436 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 64K, §§ 1-14 (West
Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 297D.01-.14 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 77-4301 to -4316 (Reissue 1990 &
Cum. Supp. 1994); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 372A.010-.150 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-18A-1 to -7 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-113.105 to .113 (1992 &
Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-36.1-01 to -16 (1993); Oxi.K STAT. ANN. tit.
68, §§ 450.1-.9 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 44-49-1 to -16 (Supp. 1994); TFx.
TAx CODE ANN. §§ 159.001-.301 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 59-19-101 to -107 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.87-.96 (West Supp. 1994).
10. An excise tax is:
A tax imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an occu-
pation, or the enjoyment of a privilege. A tax on the manufacture, sale,
or use of goods or on the carrying on of an occupation or activity, or a tax
on the transfer of property.
BLAcKes LAw DIcTIONARY 563 (6th ed. 1990).
11. See ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-1 to -16 (1993); ARm. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1201 to -
1218 (1991 & Supp. 1994); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-28.7-101 to -109 (Brad-
ford 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-650 to -664 (West 1993); IDAHO CODE
§§ 63-4201 to -4211 (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 520/1-520/26
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IowA CODE. ANN. §§ 453B.1-.16 (West Supp.
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5201 to -5211 (1989 & Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 47:2601 to :2610 (West Supp. 1995); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 64K, §§ 1-
14 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 297D.01-.14 (West 1991); NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 77-4301 to -4316 (Reissue 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT.
§§ 372A-010-.150 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-113.105 to .113 (1992 & Supp.
1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-36.1-01 to -16 (1993); OKLA_ STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
§§ 450.1-.9 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 44-49-1 to -16 (Supp. 1994); TEx. TAx
CODE ANN. §§ 159.001-.301 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-
101 to -107 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.87-.96 (West Supp. 1994).
12. Wyoming law provides that "sales of controlled substances... which are not sold
pursuant to a written prescription of or through a licensed practitioner" are not
within the wholesale exemption to the state's excise tax Wyo. STAT. § 39-6-
405(aXxix) (1994). Additionally, courts in Michigan and Pennsylvania have de-
termined illegal drug transactions to be subject to sales tax liability. See Greer v.
Department of Treasury, 377 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)(rejecting conten-
tion that the sale of marijuana is not a taxable sale); Zimmerman v. Common-
wealth, 449 A.2d 103 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982)(holding that illegal sale of
1995]
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All specific-model drug tax schemes, with one exception,'S deline-
ate different tax rates based upon the type of drug. The typical
scheme establishes the tax rate based on whether the drug is mari-
juana, a controlled substancei 4 sold by weight, or a controlled sub-
stance not sold by weight.15 For example, Nebraska taxes marijuana
at $100 per ounce,16 controlled substances face a levy of $150 per
gram,17 and controlled substances not sold by weight incur a tax lia-
bility of $500 for every 50 units of the drug.' 8 Other states also levy
the tax on whole marijuana plants in order to facilitate easier taxation
calculations on marijuana crops.' 9 Although "dealers" are usually the
only persons required to pay the tax, the statutes often define the term
so broadly as to cover those who possess a small amount of drugs for
strictly personal use.20
The obligation to pay the tax typically arises immediately upon ac-
quisition or possession of the drugs. 21 Other statutes define the tax
liability more expansively. For example, Florida levies the tax upon
each "sale, use, consumption, distribution, manufacture, derivation,
methaqualone did not fall within the prescription or over-the-counter drug ex-
emption to the sales tax). Minnesota has taxed drugs under its income tax provi-
sions. See Swyningan v. Commissioner, No. 4706, 1987 WL 25995 (Minn. Tax Ct.
Dec. 7, 1987).
13. The lone exception is the Florida statute. Florida taxes all drugs at 50% of the
estimated retail price with an added 25% percent surcharge. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 212.0505(1) (West 1989).
14. In Nebraska a controlled substance is defined as "any drug or substance, includ-
ing an imitation controlled substance, that is held, possessed, transported, trans-
ferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Nebraska law. Controlled
substance shall not include marijuana." NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4301(1) (Cum.
Supp. 1994).
15. Controlled substances not sold by weight would include those drugs sold in pill or
capsule form.
16. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-4303(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
17. Id. § 77-4303(1)(b).
18. Id. § 77-4303(1)(c).
19. See Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1204 (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 63-4203(2)(d)
(Supp. 1994).
20. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-4301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1994), in which a dealer is
defined as:
a person who, in violation of Nebraska law, manufactures, produces,
ships, transports, or imports into Nebraska or in any manner acquires or
possesses six or more ounces of marijuana, seven or more grams of any
controlled substance which is sold by weight, or ten or more dosage units
of any controlled substance which is not sold by weight.
21. See Ai. CODE § 40-17A-11 (1993); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1212.02B (1991);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-651(c) (West 1993); IDAHo CODE § 63-4205(2) (Supp.
1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 520/12 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 79-5204(d) (Supp. 1994); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 64K, § 11 (West Supp.
1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 297D.11 (West 1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-4305 (Reis-
sue 1990); N.D. CENr. CODE § 57-36.1-11 (1993); OHLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 450.3
(West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-49-12(2) (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-
19-105(2) (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.89 (West Supp. 1994).
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production, transportation, or storage" of narcotics. 22 Conversely,
Maine attaches tax liability only after the person has been convicted
under state or federal law for a drug-related offense.
23
The existence of drug tax schemes has not resulted in compliance.
Available statistics from Massachiisetts,24 Minnesota,25 Idaho, Utah
and Wisconsin 26 demonstrate that sales of drug stamps raise little
revenue. Those who buy the stamps are thought to be stamp collec-
tors27 or those in search of a novelty item.28 Such conclusions are
problematic, however, since statutes prevent tax officials from inquir-
ing into a person's motive for buying the stamps.2
9
Failure to pay the tax can result in additional civil and criminal
penalties. Most states impose a penalty equal to 100% of the tax.
3 0
Violators in Colorado31 and Illinois 32 face penalties of three and four
times the amount of the tax respectively. On the other end of the spec-
trum, some statutes allow the state to levy penalties only at the rate
provided for violations of other tax statutes.3 3 Furthermore, defend-
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.0505(1)(a) (West 1989).
23. ME. REV. STAT. AN. tit. 36, § 4434 (Supp. 1994).
24. See Peter J. Howe, Drug-Tax Stamp Sales Are Limited: Officials Say Buyers
May Be Collectors, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 15 (in six months only 81 tax
stamps for marijuana were sold).
25. See Catherine Foster, 'Grass Tax'Aims for Dealers' Wallets, CmusTIAN SCIENCE
MoNITOR, Aug. 11, 1989, at 8 (in a three year period, Minnesota sold only 294
stamps amounting to $2000).
26. See Frank A. Racaniello, Note, State Drug Taxes: A Tax We Can't Afford, 23
RuTGmaS L.J. 657, 665-66 (1992Xdetailing that Idaho had sold only 109 mari-
juana stamps, Utah 588 stamps, and Wisconsin $800.00 worth).
27. Interview with Phil Richmond, Special Assistant to the Tax Commissioner of the
Nebraska Department of Revenue, in Lincoln, Neb. (Sept. 24, 1994); Collectors
Are Only Buyers of Stamp to Tax Illegal Drugs, Cm. Tasm., May 3, 1990, at 3;
Foster, supra note 25, at 8; Scott Rothschild, Texas Tax on Illegal Drugs Trips Up
Dealers, PELADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 24, 1990, at C12.
28. Racaniello, supra note 26, at 665.
29. See, e.g., Marijuana and Controlled Substances Tax Regulations, REG-94-
003.03A(1), Nebraska Department of Revenue (1992).
30. See Aia. CODE § 40-17A-9 (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-660(a) (West
1993); IDAHO CODE § 63-4207(1) (Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-11(a)
(Burns Supp. 1994); IowA CODE. ANN. § 453B.12 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 79-5208 (1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:2607(B) (West Supp. 1995);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 64K, § 9 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 297D.09 (West 1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 372A.070 (1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-
4309 (Cum. Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN STAT. § 105-113.110A (1992); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57-36.1-09 (1993); Oxua. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 450.8(A) (West 1992); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 44-49-10(1) (Supp. 1994); Tx. TAX CODE ANN. § 159.201(b) (West
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-19-106(1) (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.95(1) (West
Supp. 1994).
31. COLO. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 39-28.7-107 (Bradford 1994).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 520/10 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994).
33. See FIA STAT. ANN. § 212.0505(3) (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-15-9 (Harri-
son 1990).
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ants face felony charges in several states,3 4 while other statutes pro-
vide punishment ceilings within the tax statute itself. The latter
approach most often allows a maximum fine of $10,000 and/or five
years imprisonment.3 5
Because persons who fail to comply face assessments of the tax
plus a penalty, the amount assessed can be exorbitant. For example,
the failure of a Utah man to purchase drug tax stamps resulted in an
assessment of a $217.6 million claim against him.36 The State of Ne-
braska has issued over $162.2 million in drug tax assessments since
1991. The average assessment under the law is nearly $400,000 per
person.3 7 However, collection of assessment monies has been prob-
lematic. Of the $162.2 million assessed, only $322,988.67 has been
collected (one-fifth of one-percent of total assessments).3 8 Other
states also report poor assessment-collection ratios.3 9
Proponents of drug tax statutes typically offer at least two ratio-
nales for the laws. First, drug tax statutes are based upon a principle
of tax fairness. Persons who engage in the drug trade often realize an
income that is largely tax-free.40 Any equitable system of taxation
would accordingly seek to ensure that all taxpayers pay their fair
34. See ALA. CODE § 40-17A-9 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 520/10 (Smith-
Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-11(b) (Burns Supp. 1994);
IOWA CODE. ANN. § 453B.12 (West Supp. 1994); Nnm. REv. STAT. § 77-4309 (Cum.
Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN STAT. § 105-113.110(a) (1992); N.D. Cent. Code § 57-36.1-
09 (1993); TEx TAx CODE ANN. § 159.201(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-19-106(2) (1992).
35. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5208 (1989); LA. R v. STAT. ANN. § 47:2607(C) (West
Supp. 1995); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 64K, § 9 (West Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 450.8 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-49-10(1)(a) (Supp. 1994);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 139.95(2) (West Supp. 1994). Minnesota's statute provides for
a $14,000 fine and/or 7 years imprisonment. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297D.09(1)(a)
(West 1991).
36. Foster, supra note 25, at 8.
37. Interview with Phil Richmond, supra note 27. Four hundred and nine assess-
ments have been issued since 1991. The total amount assessed has been
$162,202,797.84, with the average assessment totaling $396,583.86.
38. Interview with Phil Richmond, supra note 27. The amount collected from assess-
ments excludes tax stamp sales. Nebraska has collected on 48 of the 409 assess-
ments issued.
39. See Gould, supra note 8, at 557-58 (in first year of their statutes, Illinois and
Nevada levied $68,200 and $27,488,836 respectively, but collected nothing);
Joyce, supra note 7, at 237 ($32,951,655 assessed under Minnesota statute with
$1,791,506 collected); Michael C. Buelow, Wisconsin Drug Law Is Rarely Used,
PILADELPmA INQuIFER, Feb. 17, 1991, at C13 ($1.1 million assessed, $4,118 col-
lected in Wisconsin); Foster, supra note 25, at 8 (Kansas imposed nearly $2 mil-
lion in levies and received $7,860.40); Tax on Illegal Drugs Yields Little Revenue,
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5, 1989, at 1B ($253 million with $538,461 realized under
Florida scheme).
40. The Internal Revenue Service estimates that approximately 50-90% of the value
of sales of cocaine constituted income. Of that amount only about 10% was actu-
ally reported to the IRS. Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The
226 [Vol. 74:221
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share. Drug tax statutes provide the states with a mechanism in
which to tap into illegal drug profits. 41 Second, drug tax statutes pro-
vide prosecutors with an additional weapon in the war on drugs. Be-
cause tax officials do not expect drug dealers to arrive at the tax office
to pay drug tax assessments,42 the statutes provide law enforcement
authorities with another sanction, in addition to the applicable crimi-
nal laws, in which to deter already unlawful activity.43
Despite challenges on several constitutional fronts, state drug tax
statutes have remained relatively unscathed.44 The courts have re-
jected constitutional arguments based upon self-incrimination,45 sub-
stantive46  and procedural47  due process, equal protection,
48
Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1305, 1396-97
(1983).
41. Joyce, supra note 7, at 242.
42. Commentators widely agree that noncompliance is expected. See Ann L. Iijima,
The War on Drugs: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Falls Victim to State
Taxation of Controlled Substances, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 101, 102 (1994);
Racaniello, supra note 26, at 679; Lome H. Seidman, Taxing Controlled Sub.
stances, 6 J. ST. TAX'N 257, 257 (1987); Buelow, supra note 39, at C13; Foster,
supra note 25, at 8; Howe, supra note 24, at 18; Jennifer Toth, Dealers May Find
New Drug War Tactic Very Taxing, L.A. Thms, May 14, 1991, at 5.
43. Iijima, supra note 42, at 102; Racaniello, supra note 26, at 666; Buelow, supra
note 39, at C13.
44. The Nebraska Supreme Court has conceded that the Nebraska statute raises
"countless" constitutional issues. State v. Garza, 242 Neb. 573, 577, 496 N.W.2d
448, 452 (1993). For a summary of case law regarding the constitutionality of
drug tax statutes see Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of State Laws Imposing Tax or License Fee on Possession, Sale, or
the Like, of Illegal Narcotics, 12 A.L.R. 5th 89 (1993).
45. See Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So.2d 120, 122-23 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991);
State v. Godberson, 493 N.W.2d 852, 856-57 (Iowa 1992); Clifl v. Indiana Dep't of
State Revenue, 641 N.E.2d 682,685-89 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1994); State v. Durrant, 769
P.2d 1174 (Kan. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923 (1989); Sisson v. Triplett, 428
N.W.2d 565, 571-74 (Minn. 1988); State v. Garza, 242 Neb. 573, 496 N.W.2d 448
(1993); Lopez v. State, 837 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Davis,
787 P.2d 517, 519-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Heredia, 493 N.W.2d 404,
406-07 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2386 (1993). See also State v.
Smith, 813 P.2d 888,890 (Idaho 1991). The Court in Smith struck down the 1989
version of the Idaho statute because of its failure to provide confidentiality to
stamp purchasers. The Court noted in dicta that the amended version of the stat-
ute would not violate self-incrimination. The 1990 version of the statute imposes
penalties upon tax authorities who violate taxpayer confidentiality and prohibits
the use of the information in criminal proceedings.
But see Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Herre, 634 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1994)(holding
statute violates self-incrimination when law enforcement authorities can sub-
poena taxpayer information); State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986)(refus-
ing the State's request to read the South Dakota statute so as to require taxpayer
confidentiality). For a criticism of the majority view that drug tax statutes do not
violate self-incrimination see generally Iijima, supra note 42.
46. See Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So.2d 120, 123 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991);
State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 444-45 (Iowa 1993); State v. Matson, 798 P.2d
1995]
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vagueness 49 and overbreadth.so However, in light of Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,51 double jeopardy may become the constitu-
tional argument of choice used to combat drug tax levies when the
state also extracts a criminal conviction.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS
The Double .Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that, "INlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."52 The protection against being twice
put in jeopardy prevents the state5 3 or federal government 54 from im-
488, 493-95 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minm.
1988).
47. See Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So.2d 120, 122 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991);
Cliff v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 641 N.E.2d 682, 691 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1994);
Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 568-71 (Minn. 1988); State v. Heredia, 493
N.W.2d 404, 408 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2386 (1993). But
see Boll v. Department of Revenue, 247 Neb. 473, 528 N.W.2d 300 (1995)(requir-
ing indigent parties to post security as a prerequisite to a redetermination hear-
ing violates due process).
48. See Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 641 N.E.2d 682, 689-90 (Ind. Tax Ct.
1994); O'Daniel v. Commissioner of Revenue, No. 5723, 1991 WL 25488 (Minn.
Tax Ct. Feb. 8, 1991); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 855-57 (Utah
1992).
49. See State v. Ryan, 501 N.W.2d 516, 518 (Iowa 1993)(delay in the formulation of
revenue department regulations did not render the statute impermissibly vague);
Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. 1988)("dealer" and "controlled
substance" are adequately defined in statute); State v. Garza, 242 Neb. 573, 586-
87, 496 N.W.2d 448, 457 (1993X"dealer" is not vague); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n,
842 P.2d 848, 854-55 (Utah 1992)("dosage unit" is not unconstitutionally vague);
State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 524 and n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(rejecting in dicta
the argument that statute does not sufficiently state where tax stamps are to be
affixed); State v. Heredia, 493 N.W.2d 404, 408-09 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2386 (1993)(term "dealer" gave fair notice to persons covered
under statute).
50. See State v. Garza, 242 Neb. 573, 586-87, 496 N.W.2d 448, 457 (1993)(term
"dealer" is not overbroad).
51. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
52. Although a literal reading of the provision would suggest application only to pros-
ecutions risking capital or corporal punishment, such a narrow construction has
long been rejected. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 24.1(b), at 61-62 (1984). Double jeopardy protection was extended to "felo-
nies, minor crimes, and misdemeanors alike" in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 173 (1873). It is suggested that the Court's rejection of the literal
language of the Amendment "reflected its belief that the range of criminal pun-
ishments had increased in variety and significance since the formulation of the
'ife or limb' terminology." Note, A Definition of Punishment for Implementing the
Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 YALE L.J. 632,
641 (1981).
53. The Double Jeopardy Clause was held to be applicable to the states in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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posing second prosecutions or multiple punishments55 upon defend-
ants for the same offense. The basic value underlying the protection is
verdict finality. Verdict finality is said to lie at "the core of [the]
double jeopardy doctrine."56 The protection provides that "the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make re-
peated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting [the defendant] to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though inno-
cent he may be found guilty."57
A. Defining the Same Offense
To establish a double jeopardy claim the defendant must show she
has already been prosecuted or punished for the same offense. In
Blockburger v. United States,58 the Supreme Court held that two stat-
utory offenses are not the same for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause when "each provision requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not."59 For example, if Crime 1 requires proof of ele-
ments A, B, and C, and Crime 2 requires proof of elements A and B,
the two crimes are the same offense. Crime 1 contains an additional
element, C, not contained in Crime 2; but Crime 2 does not contain an
element that is not found in Crime 1. Crime 2 is thus a lesser-in-
cluded offense of Crime 1. When a defendant commits Crime 1, she
has necessarily committed Crime 2. On the other hand, if Crime 1
requires proof of elements A, B, and C, and Crime 2 requires proof of
elements, A, B, and D, the two offenses are not the same. Each crime
contains an element not found in the other.
54. A defendant has not been placed in double jeopardy when both the state and
federal governments prosecute for the same offense under the dual sovereignty
exception to double jeopardy. For example, if D commits the act of bank robbery
and both the state and federal government have statutes that proscribe such con-
duct, D can be convicted under both statutes if the sovereigns have jurisdiction
over the matter. The dual sovereignty doctrine was described in United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), in which the Supreme Court held that "an act de-
nounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against
the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each." Id. at 382.
55. Double jeopardy is said to consist of "three separate constitutional protections. It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It pro-
tects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
56. George C. Thomas I, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. IuL. L.
Rxv. 827, 883 (1983).
57. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
58. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
59. Id. at 304.
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If two offenses are the same under this inquiry, the state can only
convict the defendant for one of the offenses unless both punishments
are imposed in the same trial and such a result is intended by the
legislature. An additional conviction under any other same offense
provision would be barred.60 Consider, for example, a state statute
that creates the crimes of assault and assault with the intent to kill.
Crime 1, assault, requires proof of an assault (Element A). Crime 2
requires proof of an assault (A) and proof of an intent to kill (Element
B). In such a case, assault is a lesser-included offense of assault with
intent to kill. A judge or jury could only convict a defendant who com-
mitted an assault with the intent to kill of either assault or assault
with the intent to kill, but not both. It is likely that the legislature
intended such a result. Sentencing the defendant for the single crime
of assault with intent to kill would serve the state's interest in prohib-
iting all assaults, and would also serve the heightened interest in de-
terring assaults that create a greater risk of serious bodily harm.
The claim that legislatures do not intend to punish both lesser- and
greater-included offenses may be rebutted even if an analysis of the
elements suggests otherwise under Blockburger. In Missouri v.
Hunter,61 the Supreme Court ruled that when the legislature clearly
intends for two "same offense" sanctions to be imposed in the same
proceeding, the Blockburger test will not be controlling. All the Court
requires to circumnavigate the Blockburger test is clear legislative in-
tent to impose both sanctions, and both punishments must be imposed
in the same trial.62 The Hunter majority emphasized that the defend-
ant had been subjected to only one trial and therefore was only pun-
ished once. As a result, the underlying value of verdict finality was
not undermined.6 3
60. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977)("[TIhe Fifth Amendment forbids suc-
cessive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included
offense.")
61. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
62. Id. at 368-69 ("Where... a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punish-
ment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the
'same' conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of statutory construction is at an
end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumula-
tive punishment under such statutes in a single trial.").
63. Id. at 365. See also Thomas, supra note 56, at 838 ("When government seeks
multiple punishment by instituting multiple trials, protecting finality automati-
cally limits its punishment. Finality, of course, does not limit the number of pun-
ishments in a single trial."). But see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 371
(Marshall, J., dissenting)(arguing that verdict finality is undermined when the
state is allowed to circumvent the multiple punishment prohibition by imposing
both sanctions in the same proceeding). See also Note, A Definition of Punish-
ment, supra note 52, at 649 ("The same policy considerations, fairness and final-
ity, underlie both the ban of multiple punishment and retrial prohibition.
Prohibiting exposure to multiple trials would be insufficient if the government
could later impose multiple sanctions.").
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B. Double Jeopardy and Civil Sanctions
If the defendant has been convicted criminally and the state seeks
to impose a sanction for the crime in a civil proceeding, the defendant
must show (1) both sanctions are for the same offense, and (2) double
jeopardy protections extend to the civil context. The courts have
struggled to articulate when constitutional protections, including
double jeopardy, are applicable to civil proceedings.64 In some in-
stances, the United States Supreme Court has found the language of
the guarantee itself to be instructive.6 5 For example, the Sixth
Amendment is expressly limited to "criminal prosecutions."66 The
Fifth Amendment's grand jury and self-incrimination privileges also
have explicit textual references to criminal proceedings.67 On the
other hand, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure does not contain the criminal limitation.68 Accord-
ingly, while Fourth Amendment protections have been extended to
civil proceedings, self-incrimination privileges and the right to grand
jury have not.69 Other constitutional protections not expressly limited
to a criminal or civil context, such as double jeopardy,70 have been
limited to criminal proceedings by courts.71 The civil-criminal label
has thus become crucial to persons facing civil sanctions. A determi-
nation that the proceeding is civil resolves the criminal constitutional
right dilemma: all rights that are solely criminal are inapplicable.
Double jeopardy is no exception. If the proceeding is held to be civil,
double jeopardy protections are inapplicable.72
64. J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
Constitutional Analysis, 60 MN. L. REv. 379, 391 (1976).
65. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 n.4 (1993); Iijima, supra note 42, at
111.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury...
nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.").
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2804 n.4 (1993).
70. Clark, supra note 64, at 382-83 n.10 ("The double jeopardy clause has been re-
stricted to 'criminal' punishment despite the lack of an explicit textual reference
to criminal prosecutions.").
71. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
72. See 3 JoSEPH G. CooK, CONSTITUTIONAL RiGrs OF THE ACCUSED § 23:10, at 330
(2d ed. 1986); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Crimi-
nal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HAsTINGs L.J. 1325, 1373 (1991); Linda S. Eads,
Separating Crime from Punishment: The Constitutional Implications of United
States v. Halper, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 929, 944 (1990); Nelson T. Abbott, Note,
United States v. Halper: Making Double Jeopardy Available in Civil Actions, 6
B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 551,553 (1992); Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil Sanctions and
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In resolving the civil-criminal label dilemma, courts have initially
looked to the statutory scheme. The Supreme Court analyzed statutes
in terms of punitiveness but provided considerable deference to the
legislature. An important early case illustrating this point was
Helvering v. Mitchell.73 The defendant in Helvering was acquitted of a
tax evasion charge brought by criminal indictment. The Commis-
sioner of Revenue then initiated a civil proceeding for the $728,709.84
tax deficiency along with a 50% penalty of $364,354.92.74 The
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that the penalty
constituted criminal punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. The
Court reasoned that if the statute reveals the legislature intended to
create a civil remedy, then double jeopardy protection does not
apply.75
The Court in Helvering clearly elucidated what was at stake in its
decision. If the Court were to determine that tax proceedings were
criminal, other constitutional protections would also be applicable.
The Court noted that civil proceedings were "incompatible with the
accepted rules and constitutional guaranties governing the trial of
criminal prosecutions."76 Otherwise, the Court noted, civil proceed-
ings would require jury trials, the state would have to prove the de-
fendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused would have
the right to confront witnesses and to remain silent.77
The Supreme Court continued to distinguish civil and criminal pro-
cedures by construing the statute involved in each case. Legislative
deference was the theme. Double jeopardy claims were thus rejected
when the Court determined the legislature intended the procedure to
be civil.78 The Court declined to consider the punitive or remedial na-
ture of the civil penalty from the vantage point of the defendant.79
Instead a statute was considered remedial as long as it served to com-
the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Par-
allel Proceedings After United States v. Halper, 76 VA. L. RFv. 1251, 1261 (1990).
73. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
74. Id. at 395.
75. Id. at 399. ("Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect
to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely pun-
ishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same of-
fense. The question for decision is thus whether [] [the statute] imposes a
criminal sanction. That question is one of statutory construction.")(emphasis
added).
76. Id. at 402.
77. Id. at 402-04.
78. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Rex
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
79. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943)("It is true that
Punishment, in a certain and very limited sense, may be the result of the statute
before us so far as the wrong-doer is concerned,' but this is not enough to label it
as a criminal statute." (citing Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 157 (1899))).
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pensate the government for its loss.80 Few limits were imposed on
what would make the government whole. For example, the Court con-
sidered statutory sanctions providing for a fixed sum plus double dam-
ages to be nonpunitive, even though the defendant had been
previously convicted.S1
The Court eventually expressed a limited willingness to examine
the function of statutes providing for civil procedures. The defendant
in United States v. Ward82 complied with a statute that required him
to report to the proper authorities any discharge of a hazardous sub-
stance into navigable waters. On the basis of this information, the
government imposed a civil penalty upon the defendant. The defend-
ant appealed claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination had been violated. Although the Court rejected the
defendant's contention, the Court seemed to be less willing to defer to
legislative prerogative. The Court annunciated a two part test:
First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for
one label civil or criminal or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated
an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that
intention.
8 3
Even so, the defendant's claim in Ward was rejected and the second
prong was limited with the Court noting that "only the clearest proof"
would be sufficient to establish the punitiveness of a statute.8 4
The requirement that there be the clearest proof of punitive effect
prevented the Court from extending double jeopardy protection to for-
feiture proceedings with civil procedural mechanisms. In United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,8 5 the Court determined that
double jeopardy did not prevent the state from initiating a forfeiture
proceeding after the defendant had been acquitted of the same act.
The Court concluded that the second prong of the Ward analysis sup-
ported the legislature's enactment of a civil procedure. As applied, the
clearest proof requirement virtually guaranteed that absent clear in-
tent by the legislature to make a proceeding criminal, a sanction
would not be held to be punitive.8 6
Thus, persons who had been convicted criminally and were being
charged civilly faced at least two significant barriers. First, the de-
80. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972); Rex
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 (1955); United States ex rel. Mar-
cus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548 (1943).
81. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
82. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
83. Id. at 248-49.
84. Id. at 249.
85. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
86. Glickman, supra note 72, at 1260.
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fendant had to be charged with the same offense. Second, the court
would have to determine that the subsequent proceeding was in-
tended by the legislature to be civil or that the intent of the legislature
should be overridden because of punitive purpose or effect. Only the
clearest proof of the latter requirement would suffice. As a result, the
Court was able to remove criminal constitutional protections from the
civil arena.
The import of the civil-criminal distinction changed drastically
with the Court's decision in Halper v. United States.87 Halper was the
manager of a New York City medical facility that served patients eligi-
ble for Medicare benefits. During the course of his employment he
submitted sixty-five false claims for reimbursement under the Medi-
care program. Each of the sixty-five claims were charged at a rate of
$12 per claim, even though the value of the services entitled the city to
only $3 per claim. As a result, the insurance company overpaid $585
and passed along the costs to the federal government. Halper was
convicted of all sixty-five counts of violating the criminal false-claims
statute. The government then turned to an administrative remedy
provided under the civil False Claims Act. Pursuant to the Act's pen-
alty provisions, Halper was subject to a civil penalty of $2,000 per
claim. For the sixty-five claims, he faced a penalty of $130,000, or
more than 220 times the amount of the fraud.88 The district court
determined that such a penalty violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
since the government had previously convicted Halper criminally for
the same offense.89
The United States Supreme Court upheld the district court in a
unanimous decision.90 The same offense requirement was quickly dis-
posed of since the civil and criminal proceedings concerned the same
conduct.91 As precedent had suggested, the civil-criminal hurdle
would be more problematic. 92 However, the Court concluded that "the
87. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
88. Id. at 437-38.
89. The district court, on the basis of double jeopardy, refused to impose the $130,000
penalty. Instead the court awarded the Government $16,000 as reasonable com-
pensation. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). On rear-
gument the Government demonstrated that the penalty provisions were
mandatory instead of discretionary with the court. As a result, the court struck
down the entire penalty. United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852 (S.DN.Y.
1987).
90. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
91. Id. at 441.
92. Not surprisingly, the Government relied upon the civil-criminal distinction. The
Government argued that Congress clearly intended a civil sanction as a matter of
statutory construction. Id.
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labels of 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance."93 The
Court opined that:
[Wlhile recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is appropri-
ate in identifying the inherent nature of a proceeding, or in determining the
constitutional safeguards that must accompany those proceedings as a gen-
eral matter, the approach is not well suited to the context of the "humane
interests" safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multi-
ple punishments. 9 4
Rather than examine how the legislature described the proceeding,
the Court in Halper addressed a different issue: "[w]hether and under
what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute punishment for the
purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause."95 Although the Court had
earlier considered the punitive nature of the sanction, it was enough
under previous law that the legislature labeled the sanction civil in
order for the proceeding not to be punitive. The test originated by the
Halper Court was clearly different. No longer would legislative intent
control whether a sanction was sufficiently punitive. The Court rea-
soned that since both civil and criminal penalties may serve punitive
goals, "[the notion ofpuishment... cuts across the division between
the civil and the criminal law."96 Accordingly, the "intrinsically per-
sonal" protections of double jeopardy required an "asses[ment] [of] the
character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the ma-
chinery of the state."97
The Court concluded that if the defendant can show that the subse-
quent civil penalty "bears no rational relation to the goal of compen-
sating the Government for its loss" and the penalty "appears to qualify
as 'punishment' in the plain meaning of the word, the [civil] defendant
is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and costs" to
determine if the penalty is a second punishment.98 Upon a showing
that the civil penalty "bears no rational relation" to redressing the
Government's loss, the burden shifts to the Government to come for-
ward with an accounting of damages and costs in prosecuting the ac-
tion.99 The Court noted that because the calculation "inevitably
involves an element of rough justice," the Government may be com-
pensated by reasonable liquidated damages clauses.100
93. Id. at 447. But see United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)("The distinc-
tion between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional
import.").
94. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989).
95. Id. at 446.
96. Id. at 448.
97. Id. at 447.
98. Id. at 449.
99. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (1994)(O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
100. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
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Although questionable in its interpretation of prior precedent,O1
the Halper Court clearly expanded the double jeopardy protection af-
forded a defendant who faces civil and criminal sanctions. Whereas
before Halper, the defendant facing a subsequent civil sanction would
first have to show that the civil proceeding was essentially criminal,
the Halper Court concluded that criminal-civil distinctions were not
critical.1o2 Perhaps more importantly, the decision allowed the Court
to extend double jeopardy protections to civil proceedings without a
blanket extension of all criminal constitutional rights. In so doing, the
Court preserved, to some degree, the streamlined nature of civil pro-
ceedings, while protecting double jeopardy interests.
Lower courts struggled in the wake of Halper to determine its ap-
plicability to state drug tax laws. Courts differed on how to quantify
the Government's loss. Some courts equated the amount of the Gov-
ernment's loss to the amount of the unpaid tax,'0 3 while others con-
cluded that the loss was the Government's costs in initiating the tax
proceeding only.104 Still others determined that the loss could be the
costs of fighting the drug war.'0 5
Some courts even differed on whether Halper applied at all. For
example, in Sorenson v. State Department of Revenue,106 the Montana
Supreme Court concluded that "unlike the civil sanction in Halper
where such proof [an accounting] may be required, a tax requires no
proof of remedial costs on the part of the state."1o7 In another Mon-
tana case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite
conclusion and found for the defendant, because the state failed to pro-
101. See supra notes 64-86 and accompanying text. See also Eads, supra note 72, at
929 ("ignored a consistent line of cases recognizing Double Jeopardy protection in
the context of a criminal proceeding"); Abbot, supra note 72, at 11 ("overturned
years of precedent"); Glickman, supra note 72, at 1251 ("departed from fifty years
of double jeopardy jurisprudence"); Elizabeth S. Jahncke, United States v.
Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double Jeopardy & Excessive Fines Clauses,
66 N.Y.U. L. lxv. 112, 133 (1991)("signified a substantial shift in the Court's
treatment of double jeopardy challenges.").
102. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989).
103. See Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So.2d 120, 124 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991);
State v. Riley, 479 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
104. See New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Whitener, 869 P.2d 829, 833 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted, 718 P.2d 984 (N.M. 1994).
105. See Rehg v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 525, 537 (Ill. 1992). See also In
re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1992)(concluding that the failure
of the Department of Revenue to provide an accounting prevented the court from
taking judicial notice of "the staggering costs associated with fighting drug abuse
in this country."). Even in civil penalty situations, courts did not limit the gov-
ernment to a showing of the costs related to prosecuting individual defendants.
Instead, overall costs to the public in general were considered. Abbott, supra
note 72, at 117-18.
106. 836 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992).
107. Id. at 33.
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vide an accounting of its loss.108 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch 109 to re-
solve these conflicting results.
IV. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. KURTH RANCH
A. Facts
In the wake of financial troubles on the Kurth family farm, mari-
juana harvesting became the Kurth's cash crop. 110 Until law enforce-
ment authorities responded, the Kurth farm was "the largest
marijuana growing operation in the State of Montana.11l When
criminal charges were eventually brought, all six family members pled
guilty. The court sentenced two of the family members to prison. The
others received suspended or deferred prison sentences.112 A civil for-
feiture action was then filed against the Kurths. The Kurths' agree-
ment to settle the action resulted in the forfeiture of $18,016 in cash
and equipment."3
Montana's then recently enactedll4 Dangerous Drug Taxl15 gave
rise to the next legal proceeding. According to the statute, a tax was
levied "on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs" and could be
"collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have been
satisfied."116 The rate of taxation was the greater of 10% of the mar-
ket value of the drugs or $100 per ounce of marijuana and $250 per
ounce of hashish.117 Applicable regulations mandated that a tax re-
turn be filed within seventy-two hours after arrest."18
108. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1311-1312 (9th Cir. 1993).
109. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
110. From their marijuana farming, the Kurths intended to earn at least $2 milion
over a two-year period. Reply Brief for Petitioner, 1993 WL 657649, at *9, De-
partment of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994)(No. 93-144).
111. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
112. Richard Kurth pled guilty to the offenses of "criminal sale of dangerous drugs,"
"criminal possession of a dangerous drug," and "solicitation to commit the offense
of criminal possession of a dangerous drug." Judith M. Kurth, Douglas Kurth,
Rhonda Kurth, Clay Halley and Cindy Halley all pled guilty to the offense of
"conspiracy to commit the offense of criminal possession of a dangerous drug." In
re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 64-65 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
113. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (1994).
114. The drug tax went into effect 17 days before law enforcement authorities raided
the Kurth farm.
115. The tax was codified at MONT. CODE ANx, §§ 15-25-101 to 15-25-123 (1987). The
citations to the Montana statute in Part H supra, reference the amended version
of the statute.
116. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994)(citing
MONT. CODE ANI. §§ 15-25-111 and 15-25-113(3) (1987)).
117. Id. (citing MoNT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111(2) (1987)). The statute also taxed drugs
other than marijuana and hashish at varying rates.
118. Id. (citing MONT. ADmni. R. 42-34.102(1) (1988)).
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Pursuant to the statute, the Montana Department of Revenue
sought to levy a tax assessment of $894,940.99119 upon the drugs
seized in the police raid of the Kurth ranch.120 The drug tax proceed-
ings were stayed when the Kurths filed for bankruptcy.121 In the
bankruptcy proceedings the Kurths argued, among other things, that
the assessment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.122 The bank-
ruptcy court submitted the assessment to a Halper analysis and found
for the Kurths because the Department of Revenue failed to produce
evidence of the State's loss from the sale of illicit drugs. Additionally,
the court noted that because drug tax laws are "essentially penal in
nature and assist in the enforcement of the state's criminal laws," the
Montana law violated the protection against being held twice in jeop-
ardy.123 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy courts judg-
ment. 124 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also affirmed, but
refused to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face.125 The court
instead relied upon the failure of the State to produce the accounting
mandated by Halper.126
B. The Kurth Ranch Holding and Analysis
The United States Supreme Court struck down the Montana tax as
violating double jeopardy in a 5-4 decision.' 27 Interestingly, the
Court did not engage in a Blockburger analysis to ensure the Kurths
were being prosecuted for the "same offense." The Department of Rev-
enue failed to raise the issue in the lower courts.12 s Similarly, the
119. Id. at 1943 n.10 (citing In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 68 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1990)).
120. In the raid authorities seized 2155 marijuana plants, 7 gallons of hash oil, 4 two-
pound bags of marijuana, 65 1 gram vials of hash tar, 14 baby-food-size jars of
hash tar, one-fourth pound bag of marijuana, 5 plastic bags of marijuana totaling
2230 grams, and 100 pounds of marijuana leaves and stems. In re Kurth Ranch,
145 B.R. 61, 66-67 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
121. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (1994).
122. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 72-73 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
123. Id. at 74-75.
124. In re Kurth Ranch, No. CV-90-084-GF, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. 1991).
125. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993).
126. Id. at 1312.
127. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
128. Id. at 1942 n.9. Had Montana raised the issue, perhaps the result in Kurth
Ranch would have been different as applied to five of the six defendants. Only
one of the six Kurth family defendants, Richard Kurth, pled to the charge of pos-
session of dangerous drugs. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner at n.4, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994)(No. 93-144) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). A possessory offense will
generally be considered a lesser-included offense of a drug tax violation. The
Blockburger test would suggest at least two elements are necessary if a person
fails to pay drug tax liability: possession of drugs (Element A) and failure to meet
tax liabilities (Element B). Therefore, possession is a lesser-included offense of a
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practitioner who neglects to raise the same offense issue at the trial
court level does so at her own peril.
The majority noted that Halper did not present the question of
whether a tax may be considered punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis.129 This distinction was critical, the Court con-
cluded, because taxes and penalties serve different purposes. Accord-
ingly, the majority sought to annunciate tax-specific criteria to
determine when an illegal drug tax, imposed in a subsequent civil pro-
ceeding, went beyond legitimate taxation and served impermissible
punishment objectives.130 In finding the imposed tax to be punish-
ment, the Court analyzed four aspects of the Montana statute: its high
rate of taxation, its obvious deterrent purpose, the fact that it was
collected only after the person had been arrested, and the fact that it
was collected only after the goods had been confiscated.13s These cir-
cumstances led the Court to conclude that the tax was "the functional
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the Kurths
in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offense.' "132
1. The Precedential Value of Halper v. United States
In Halper, a unanimous Supreme Court established its willingness
to closely scrutinize civil penalties imposed in proceedings following
criminal conviction.' 33 Even though the Court in Kurth Ranch sug-
gested, in dicta, that the Halper test would lead to the same result,'3 4
drug tax charge. One cannot commit the offense of failing to pay drug taxes and
not also commit the offense of possession. The other family members pled guilty
to conspiracy to possess dangerous drugs. Conspiracy would not be a lesser-in-
cluded charge of a drug tax violation. Conspiracy requires, at a minimum, an
agreement (Element C) to commit a criminal act. Conspiracy is not a lesser-in-
cluded charge since each crime requires proof of an element the other does not.
In this case conspiracy requires proof of Element C, while failure to pay drug
taxes requires proof of Elements A and B. A strict Blockburger analysis would
thus suggest that only Richard Kurth was held twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. Id.
Although the issue was not raised in the lower courts, the Kurths countered
that the five other members of the Kurth operation were initially charged with
possessory offenses also. After the Kurths agreed to plead to conspiracy to pos-
session of dangerous drugs, the prosecutor dismissed the possession charges. The
Kurths contended that since the possession charge was dropped, the state was
precluded from charging the defendants with the same offense. Brief for Respon-
dents, 1993 WL 657633, at *5, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct.
1937 (1994)(No. 93-144).
129. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994).
130. Id. at 1946.
131. Id. at 1946-48.
132. Id. at 1948.
133. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 935 (1989). See supra notes 87-102 and accom-
panying text.
134. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
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the Kurth Ranch Court adopted a double jeopardy test that applied
specifically to taxes on illegal goods. The Court justified this second
test by simply distinguishing taxes from penalties, stressing that
Halper did not present the question of whether a tax may be consid-
ered punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.135 The Kurth
Ranch majority noted that whereas penalties serve to compensate
government for its loss, taxes have an additional purpose: they raise
revenue. 136
Justice O'Connor concluded in her dissent that if the Supreme
Court had strictly applied the Halper test, the result in Kurth Ranch
would possibly have been different. According to Justice O'Connor,
"Itihere is no constitutional distinction between such a [Halper] fine
and the tax at issue in this case."137 O'Connor argued that because
under the Halper test the Kurths would be accountable for "the costs
of detecting, investigating, and raiding their operation, the price of
prosecuting them and incarcerating those who received prison
sentences, and part of the money spent on drug abuse education, de-
terrence and treatment," the Montana tax assessment should be up-
held.138 Using readily available statistics, O'Connor concluded that
the costs of apprehending, prosecuting and incarcerating the Kurths
would total at least $120,000, which the State could seek to recover
through drug tax statutes that approximate liquidated damages. 139
Nevertheless, separating taxes from penalties is a sound distinc-
tion. Taxes and penalties are fundamentally different: the primary
purpose of taxation is to raise revenue. This distinction logically fol-
lows from Halper. The Court in Halper engaged in a "particularized
assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty
may fairly be said to serve."140 Devoid of punitive intent, penalties
serve to compensate government for its losses. Likewise, it is instruc-
tive to examine the purposes of taxes. Taxes, unlike penalties, do not
serve to compensate the government for its losses. Rather, taxes seek,
in part, to raise revenue.14 ' Therefore, the proper test in light of
Halper would attempt to determine when a given tax levied after a
criminal conviction exceeds its revenue-raising function and seeks to
135. Id. at 1945.
136. Id. at 1946. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, also found the revenue-raising
function of taxes to be the basis for distinguishing taxes from penalties. Id. at
1949-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
141. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)("the purpose of a tax statute is not to recover the costs incurred by the
Government for bringing someone to book for some violation of the law, but is
instead to either raise revenue, deter conduct, or both.").
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punish. The Court in Kurth Ranch, by adopting a test specific to
taxes, furthered the reasoning of Halper by conducting an individual-
ized assessment of the sanction imposed.
As a result, the Court's opinion in Kurth Ranch, when considered
in tandem with Halper, leads to a pigeonholing of the various sanc-
tions that may be imposed by the state in a subsequent civil proceed-
ing. One test of punishment is adopted for penalties; another is
adopted for taxes. It is possible the Court may have reached a differ-
ent result if Montana had instead devised a penalty scheme based
upon the amount of drugs in the Kurths' possession, given the costs of
fighting the war on drugs.' 42 It may become necessary for the Court
to refine or synthesize these analytical categories in order to scruti-
nize taxation schemes legislatures label as penalties in order to trig-
ger the arguably more generous Halper-based analysis.
2. Drug Taxation and Punishment
When lower courts face the issue of whether a drug tax assessment
violates double jeopardy, they will undoubtedly look to the four factors
annunciated by the Court in Kurth Ranch: (1) whether the statute
imposes a high rate of taxation; (2) whether the statute has an obvious
deterrent purpose; (3) whether the tax liability is triggered upon
arrest for a crime; and, (4) whether the tax is imposed only after the
goods have been confiscated. These four factors will have profoundimplications for the taxation of illicit substances. Because such stat-
utes generally serve an obvious deterrent purpose 143 and are collected
only after the goods have been confiscated 44 pursuant to an arrest,
45
all that will remain is the determination of whether the tax impermis-
sibly serves punishment objectives in light of the tax rate assessed
upon legal goods and activities.146 Specific-model drug tax statutes
suffer from all four infirmities. For purposes of this Note, the Ne-
braska statute will be used to provide an example of these problems.
The only statutes that will survive scrutiny will be schemes that tax
illegal drugs under existing sales or income tax mechanisms or
schemes based on similar rates.
a. Rate of Taxation
The Kurth Ranch Court concluded that the Montana law imposed
an assessment with a high rate of taxation, noting that the overall
142. See id. at 1952-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(Because Justice O'Connor found no
constitutional difference between taxes and penalties, she applied a strict Halper
test and concluded the Montana statute did not violate double jeopardy.).
143. See infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 147-65 and accompanying text.
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rate of taxation was four times the market value of the drugs. The
Court reasoned as follows: "The State thus taxed the drugs at about
400 percent of their market value. Compared to similar taxes on legal
goods and activities, Montana's tax... appears to be unrivaled." 47 In
deciding the tax rate was exorbitant, the Court took notice of the tax
rate imposed by the drug tax and compared it to taxes on legal goods
and activities. In the estimation of the majority, the Montana tax was
"too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to
escape characterization as punishment."'48
Oddly enough, the majority in Kurth Ranch adopted the test advo-
cated by the United States in its amicus brief supporting the Montana
Department of Revenue. The United States argued that "the analysis
should turn on whether the tax is of a type, and in an amount, that is
ordinarily also imposed on legal goods and activities."'149 The
Supreme Court agreed this was the appropriate test but differed with
the United States on its application. The United States contended
that the Montana tax was within the range of tax rates imposed on
legal goods and activities. To reach this conclusion, the United States
pointed to a selected portion of the tax assessed against the Kurths.
The Montana Department of Revenue had taxed high grade mari-
juana with a market value of $2000 per pound at $1600 per pound, an
80% rate of taxation.150 The United States noted that a proposed fed-
eral tax on cigarettes "could easily surpass" the 80% rate imposed by
the Department of Revenue.151 The Court, however, declined to ex-
amine only these portions of the Montana tax assessment. The Court
noted that the United States could not provide an example of a tax
equivalent to Montana's taxing of a lower-valued drug at a rate of
eight times its market value152 or of a tax that approached a tax rate
of four times the market value of all the drugs confiscated from the
Kurths.53 Lower courts should therefore examine the tax rate by
147. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 n.17 (1994).
148. Id. at 1948 (emphasis added).
149. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Department
of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994)(No. 93-144) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs file).
150. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 67-68 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
151. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Department
of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994)(No. 93-144) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs fie).
152. Authorities also confiscated 100 pounds of shake. Shake is the remaining leaves
and stems of the marijuana plant. Shake has a lower street value because it
contains lower levels of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the substance that produces
the drug's narcotic effect. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 66 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1990). Shake was determined to have a market value of $200 per pound yet was
taxed at the same $1600 per pound rate-an 800% rate of taxation. Id. at 66-67.
153. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 n.17 (1994).
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looking at the overall tax rate imposed in a particular case and should
not examine only selected portions.
Perhaps because of the differing factual conclusions of the United
States and the Kurth Ranch majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist em-
ployed a different test in arguing that the tax rate imposed upon the
Kurths did not violate double jeopardy. Rehnquist contended that
only if the rate imposed was "so high as to be deemed arbitrary or
shocking" when compared to taxes on legal goods would such assess-
ments violate double jeopardy.154 He concluded that "given both the
traditional deference accorded to state authorities regarding matters
of taxation, and the fact that a substantial amount of the illegal drug
business will escape taxation altogether," the higher "arbitrary or
shocking" threshold was more appropriate.55
The Court's deference to the states in matters regarding taxation is
well documented.15 6 However, legislative deference has a more lim-
ited application when tax statutes implicate double jeopardy and
other constitutional limitations.157 Although the Court has upheld a
$100-per-ounce tax on marijuana,158 the same tax amount imposed by
Montana, double jeopardy was not at issue in that case. Instead, the
Court has employed a test similar to Rehnquist's in cases in which
double jeopardy was not at stake. For example, in United States v.
Constantine,'59 the defendant argued that a $1000 "special excise tax"
on persons selling alcoholic beverages in violation of Prohibition was
not a tax, but instead, was a penalty for violation of state law. The
defendant contended that the tax could not be imposed in any proceed-
ing because the tax was a pretext for a penalty. The Court in Constan-
tine used a test similar to that advocated by Rehnquist in Kurth
Ranch. The Constantine majority noted that,
Where, in addition to the normal and ordinary tax fixed by law, an addi-
tional sum is to be collected by reason of conduct of the taxpayer violative of
the law, and this additional sum is grossly disproportionate to the amount of
the normal tax, the conclusion must be that the purpose is to impose a penalty
as a deterrent and punishment of unlawful conduct.
1 6 0
Constantine demonstrates that defendants can attack a tax assess-
ment if it is "grossly disproportionate" to standard taxes. However,
154. Id. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); Mad-
den v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
157. In the context of a self-incrimination claim under a tax law, the Court has said,
'The Constitution of course obliges this Court to give full recognition to the tax-
ing powers and to measures reasonably incidental to their exercise. But we are
equally obliged to give full effect to the constitutional restrictions which attend
the exercise of those powers." Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58 (1968).
158. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
159. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
160. Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
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unlike a double jeopardy challenge, such an attack is not premised on
a prior criminal conviction. As a result, Rehnquist's test does not take
into account the fact that the defendant has been convicted criminally.
He would apply the same test regardless of prior convictions. How-
ever the Fifth Amendment demands a different result. The fact that a
defendant has been convicted previously is of constitutional
significance.
Tying permissible tax rates to the tax rates on legal goods and ac-
tivities when a defendant has been previously convicted does not pre-
vent the state from taxing illegal activities. The Court has long
maintained that the states may do so. 16 1 However, when the legisla-
ture taxes illegal activities for which one defendant has been previ-
ously convicted, the state should not use their illegality as grounds for
imposing exponentially higher taxes without implicating double jeop-
ardy. Taxation then becomes a subterfuge for punishment that "could
be equally well served by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction"
for the criminal offense.162
As the lower courts apply the Kurth Ranch test for taxation, they
will find that specific-model drug tax statutes impose rates of taxation
far in excess of taxes on legal goods and services. The tax rate im-
posed by Montana is not atypical of those imposed in other states.
Current drug tax statutes, including Nebraska's, do not remotely ap-
proximate the tax rates imposed upon legal goods and activities. 163
The only existing schemes likely to pass constitutional muster are
those that tax drugs under existing state sales or income tax mecha-
nisms or at similar rates. 164 In such cases, the tax does not reach the
level of a "high rate of taxation" since legal and illegal goods are taxed
at the same rate. 165 Because the taxes imposed by current drug tax
stamp and excise tax statutes do not approximate the rate applied to
legal goods and activities, they violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
when imposed in a subsequent proceeding.
161. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968); United States v. Constan-
tine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935).
162. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994).
163. For a summary of the taxes imposed on legal goods and activities in Nebraska see
1 State Tax Guide (CCH) 927.
164. Some examples are provided in note 12, supra.
165. The United States in its amicus brief drew a similar conclusion:
[Where the tax is a tax of general applicability that is imposed on
both legal and illegal goods or activities, there is ordinarily no reason for
any firther inquiry into whether it is a punishment. The fact that the
burden falls on both legal and illegal goods or activities generally en-
sures that the tax serves the normal revenue-raising purposes of
taxation.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Department
of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994)(No. 93-144) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs file).
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b. Other "Unusual Features"
The Kurth Ranch majority relied upon three other factors or "unu-
sual features" in striking down the tax assessment. The Court
stressed that the law had "an obvious deterrent purposeP166 and the
assessment was "conditioned on the commission of a crime"16 7 on
goods "the taxpayer neither own[ed] nor possesse[d] when the tax
[was] imposed."168 These factors, however, merely describe the opera-
tion of taxes on illegal goods. They do not separate permissible from
impermissible drug taxes. As a result, the only factor left to distin-
guish a constitutional drug tax scheme from an unconstitutional pun-
ishment is the rate of taxation.
In addition to a high rate of taxation, the Court determined that
the Montana tax served an obvious deterrent purpose. The Court
opined that such an obvious deterrent purpose was indicative of pun-
ishment. The Court in Kurth Ranch disposed of the obvious deterrent
purpose factor cursorily, noting only that it was "beyond question" the
Montana statute served to deter.169 All specific-model drug tax stat-
utes will be similarly afflicted since they serve deterrent purposes. 170
Obviously, illicit substance tax laws are not adopted with the in-
tent to undermine the deterrent goals of state drugs laws. For exam-
ple, persons in legal possession of drugs are exempted from specific-
model drug tax laws. Only those who violate possession laws are sub-
ject to the tax. The Nebraska statute is no exception. The Nebraska
version provides that payment of the tax does not "in any manner pro-
vide immunity for a dealer from criminal prosecution pursuant to Ne-
braska law."171 Nor is the tax applicable to persons "lawfully in
possession of marijuana or a controlled substance."1'72 The law clearly
does not sanction the possession of illegal drugs. It discourages such
possession.
In examining the deterrent purposes of drug tax statutes, the
courts should also consider the penalties that are imposed in the face
of expected noncompliance.1 73 Not only do the states seek to collect
the tax itself, they are often also able to invoke 100, 200 or 300% pen-
166. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (1994)(LEXIS,
Genfed library, Briefs file).
167. Id. at 1947.
168. Id. at 1948.
169. Id. at 1946.
170. Lower courts have recognized the deterrent purpose of drug tax statutes. See
Rehg v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 525, 520 (M. 1992); State v. Gallup,
500 N.W.2d 437, 445 (Iowa 1993); State v. Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174, 1181 (Kan.
1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923 (1989); Zissi v. State Tax Conma'n, 842 P.2d 848,
856 (Utah 1992).
171. NhB. REv. STAT. § 77-4308 (1994 Cum. Supp.).
172. Id. § 77-4303(3).
173. See supra note 42.
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alty provisions. 174 The penalty plus the tax is, in effect, a double tax.
Nebraska and several other states do not distinguish between the tax
and penalty, and require that the penalty be assessed as part of the
tax.175 Not only does the rate of taxation deter, penalties that double
and triple the rate of taxation further punish those who do not comply
with the criminal law.176
Even if the state can show that its intent was not to deter the pos-
session of illegal narcotics, evidence of the state's motive in raising
revenue is likely to be of no avail. Although the Kurth Ranch Court
recognized that the Montana legislature was motivated, in part, by
revenue-raising, the majority was unwilling to conclude that the Mon-
tana law did not also serve to deter the possession of drugs. 1 7 7 Legis-
lative claims that the purpose of the statute is to raise revenue are
undermined by the available data. The revenue raised from drug tax
statutes is negligible.17s Consider recent Nebraska Department of
Revenue Statistics. Since 1991, only ninety-eight tax stamps have
been purchased under the Nebraska statute. Ninety-one of the
stamps sold were of the lowest denomination. To date no person has
purchased $500 or $1,000 stamps. Revenue from stamp sales totals
only $1360.179 In fact, law enforcement authorities in Nebraska have
not arrested any person for the possession of illicit drugs that has
purchased the tax stamps.3SO
174. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
175. See IDAHo CODE § 63-4207(1) (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 520/10
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IowA CODE. ANN. § 453B.12 (West Supp. 1994);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 472607B (West Supp. 1994); MASS. GE. LAws ANN. ch.
64K, § 9 (West Supp. 1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 297D.09 (West 1991); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 77-4309 (Cum. Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. § 372A-070 (1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-36.1-09 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-49-10(1) (Supp. 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-19-106 (1992).
176. For commentary arguing that penalty provisions serve punishment objectives see
Iijima, supra note 42, at 117, and Racaniello, supra note 26, at 672.
177. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 n.18 (1994).
178. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
179. Tax stamp sales statistics reveal:
6. Stamps sold:
1991 1992 1993 1994 TOTAL
$ 10.00 34 14 32 11 91
$ 50.00 2 1 2 0 5
$ 100.00 2 0 0 0 2
$ 500.00 0 0 0 0 0
$1,000.00 0 0 0 0 0
Interview with Phil Richmond, supra note 27.
180. Telephone Interviews with Lieutenant Bill Hobbs, Lincoln, Sergeant Al Walton,
Norfolk, Investigator Mike Riley, Grand Island, Lieutenant Norbert Liebig,
North Platte, and Trooper Brian Heggarty, Scotts Bluff, officers of the Nebraska
State Patrol (Oct. 28, 1994), Lieutenant Mike Jones, Omaha, officer of the Ne-
braska State Patrol (May 9, 1995).
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The Kurth Ranch Court's opinion implies that whether in fact the
legislature intended to raise revenue is irrelevant. The argument that
the state seeks to recover what drug dealers are not contributing to
the tax system is no defense to a double jeopardy claim. Instead, the
presence of an obvious deterrent purpose trumps legislative intent.
The Court effectively prevents legislators from forming a legislative
history expressing a motivation to raise revenue in order to avoid
Kurth Ranch. Thus, this functionalist approach takes notice of the
fact that although some taxes on legal goods also act to deter con-
sumption, they raise revenue. Drug tax statutes, on the other hand,
operate primarily to deter illegal conduct.181
The Court also found notable that the tax is "conditioned on the
commission of a crime."182 This fact, according to the Kurth Ranch
majority, established that the statute was "significant of penal and
prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue."1s3 Still, this
is merely a description of drug tax statutes and, for that matter, all
other statutes that tax illegal goods and activities. Drug tax statutes
specifically exclude persons in lawful possession from tax liability.154
The Court merely annunciated a truism: Illegal drug taxes are levied
on illegal goods. This "unusual feature" will accordingly plague all
drug tax statutes.
Further language in the opinion suggests that the Court may have
been concerned with more than just the fact Montana chose to tax an
illegal activity. After all, on other occasions the Court has held that
the illegality of the taxed activity or good does not prevent its taxa-
tion.1 85 The Court in Kurth Ranch continued its analysis by saying
"[p]ersons who have been arrested for possessing marijuana constitute
the entire class of taxpayers subject to the Montana tax."' 8 6 The
181. "Sin" taxes on cigarettes and alcohol are the best examples of taxes on legal goods
that seek to deter consumption. However the Court in Kurth Ranch distin-
guished such "mixed-motive taxes" from taxes on illegal goods:
By imposing cigarette taxes, for example, a government wants to dis-
courage smoking. But because the product's benefits-such as creating
employment, satisfying consumer demand, and providing tax reve-
nues-are regarded as outweighing the harm, that government will al-
low the manufacture, sale, and use of cigarettes as long as the
manufacturers, sellers, and smokers pay high taxes that reduce con-
sumption and increase government revenue. These justifications vanish
when the taxed activity is completely forbidden, for the legitimate reve-
nue-raising purpose that might support such a tax could be equally well
served by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction.
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994).
182. Id. at 1947 (citing United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)).
183. Id
184. See, e.g., NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 77-4303(3) (Reissue 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
185. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935). See also United
States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950Xupholding federal marijuana transfer tax).
186. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (1994).
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Court pointed out that "the [Montana] tax assessment not only hinges
on the commission of a crime, it is exacted only after the taxpayer has
been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obliga-
tion in the first place."187 The Court's language can be read to imply
that the Montana statute would not be as offensive if the statute al-
lowed for the assessment of the tax prior to arrest.
It is helpful to illustrate this point by comparing the tax statute in
Kurth Ranch with the Nebraska statute. Tax liability under the Ne-
braska drug tax law does not arise upon arrest. The tax is due and
payable immediately upon possession of the marijuana or controlled
substances, or upon the expiration of previously purchased stamps.
At either point the dealer must purchase drug tax stamps and affix
them to the container holding the drugs. 88 There is no requirement
that the taxpayer first be arrested for a possessory drug offense. In
comparison, the Montana tax could be collected only after arrest. 8 9
It is difficult to determine if, in this respect, the Nebraska statute
is fundamentally different from the Montana scheme. Two interpreta-
tions of the ambiguity are possible: (1) the Court holds that the Mon-
tana assessment was offensive because the tax liability could only
arise after the person was arrested; or, (2) the holding implies that the
Montana tax was offensive because a person is being taxed for an act
that is also a crime. Under the first mode of analysis, a drug tax law is
not "conditioned on the commission of a crime" if the tax liability
arises upon possession but before arrest. The Nebraska statute would
pass muster under this approach. According to the second interpreta-
tion, a drug tax law poses double jeopardy problems when the pay-
ment of the tax arises from an activity that is also illegal. Under the
second approach, the Nebraska law would violate double jeopardy on
similar facts.
The latter reading is most consistent with the operation of drug tax
statutes. The fact that the tax obligation in Nebraska and other
states arises upon possession instead of arrest is merely theoretical.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent, "individuals cannot be
expected to voluntarily identify themselves as subject to the tax."'90
If violators cannot be expected to comply, then the tax liability, in ef-
fect, does not arise until arrest and criminal prosecution procedures
have been set in motion. In essence, all the Montana statute did was
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Marijuana and Controlled Substances Tax Regulations, REG-94-002.01A, Ne-
braska Department of Revenue (1992).
189. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941-42 (1994). The
Department of Revenue took exception to this claim. Reply Brief for Petitioner,
1993 WL 657649, at *4, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937
(1994)(No. 93-144).
190. Id. at 1950 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also supra note 42.
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take notice of the fact persons will not pay the tax unless they have
been arrested.191
The opposite rule would reach an unjust result. When the state
presumes persons will not comply with the statute, one must invoke a
merely theoretical distinction to contend that arrest does not trigger
tax liability. As a matter of practical circumstances, the only persons
who will be held liable for the tax are persons who have been arrested.
Drug dealers are not paying the tax voluntarily. The entire class of
taxpayers are almost inevitably people already arrested.
For the fourth variable in its decision, the Court noted that
although the Montana tax was a levy on the possession of drugs, the
tax was levied on goods the taxpayer did not own or possess when the
tax was imposed. The Court suggested the defendant did not have
possession of the drugs since "the State presumably destroyed the con-
traband goods.., before the tax on them was assessed."192 The Court
reasoned that "[a] tax on 'possession' of goods that no longer exist and
that the taxpayer never lawfully possessed has an unmistakable puni-
tive character."193
The Court's conclusion employs a narrow construction of the Mon-
tana statute. The Courts determination that the Montana tax is as-
sessed on previously confiscated goods misconstrues the Montana
statute. The Montana law does not tax the goods because they are
confiscated. Rather, the tax liability arises because the dealer pos-
sessed the drugs at a point prior to arrest, before confiscation. The
collection of the tax after the state has confiscated the contraband
merely reflects the law enforcement interest in removing drugs from
the flow of commerce. Otherwise, the state would be required to leave
the drugs in the possession of the dealer in order to tax them.194
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Nebraska statute and others
like it, will not pass scrutiny under this factor either. In Nebraska the
law imposes the tax "immediately upon acquisition or possession."195
However, the tax will only be collected after state officials have confis-
cated the drugs, because dealers will not pay the tax voluntarily. Un-
less law enforcement allows the taxpayer to keep the drugs in her
possession, the scheme runs afoul of the Court's analysis. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to conceive of a situation in which illegal drug
taxes would avoid such an infirmity. The "goods" will not be in posses-
sion of the dealer after confiscation. Nor will the dealer ever be in
191. Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1948.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1951 (Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting)("Surely the Court is not suggesting that
the State must permit the Kurths to keep the contraband in order to tax its
possession.").
195. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 77-4305 (Reissue 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
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lawful possession since the activity itself is against the law. Thus, the
Court's reasoning is puzzling. Drug taxation will overcome this hur-
dle only if the courts establish an overly technical rule that requires
the state to inform the drug dealer of the tax liability before confiscat-
ing the drugs. The drugs will be confiscated first as a matter of course.
The Court's claim that all drug tax statutes have an obvious deter-
rent effect is reasonable. Its deduction that drug tax liability will
arise after the arrest is logical. The Court's suggestion that drug as-
sessments are a tax on nonexistent goods, however, is difficult to com-
prehend. In any event, these three factors point in the same direction:
Specific-model drug tax statutes are of questionable constitutionality.
The only factor the legislature can reasonably attempt to impact is the
rate of taxation.
C. Implications for the Taxation of Illicit Substances
If a state should still seek to impose a drug tax assessment after a
defendant has been convicted for a possessory drug offense, the tax
rate must not impermissibly serve punishment objectives in compari-
son to the tax rate assessed upon legal goods and activities.396 Taxing
the income or sales of persons who engage in illegal activities is cer-
tainly a laudable goal. Tax statutes, in some form, are necessary to
ensure that persons who operate outside the law pay their fair share.
Means remain to achieve this objective that do not implicate double.
jeopardy protections. States can employ existing tax mechanisms,
such as income or sales tax provisions, without running afoul of
double jeopardy. The Court's opinion in Kurth Ranch does not fore-
close states from taxing drugs at a rate similar to that imposed on
legal goods. The double jeopardy clause would not be implicated even
though the state previously convicted the defendant for a drug-related
offense. When the legislature taxes drugs at the rate of legal goods
and activities, the rate of taxation does not fall into the punitive cate-
gory. Existing sales and income tax laws therefore provide a conve-
nient mechanism for the states to tax illicit drug revenue. They do not
violate double jeopardy protections because the applicability of the tax
law is not based upon a distinction between the criminal and the law-
abiding citizen. Each and every person is subject to the tax. The drug
dealer cannot therefore claim to have been singled out in retribution
for his illegal activities.
Although imposing taxes on illegal drugs under income and sales'
tax schemes present difficult problems of proof,197 courts will often
uphold revenue department methods of calculating tax assessments
196. See generally subsection IV.B.2.
197. See Wisotsky, supra note 40, at 1376-77.
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under existing income' 98 and sales tax schemes.' 99 To the extent the
states may wish to avoid problems of proof altogether, the state could
instead tax the possession of the illegal goods at a rate equivalent to
the sales or income tax rate. Because the rate of taxation is equated to
that imposed on legal goods and activities, the statutes do not impli-
cate double jeopardy. The drug would be taxable at a rate similar to
the income or sales tax rate based upon the drug's market value. The
statutory mechanisms to administer this excise tax are already in
place. The legislature would only have to amend the rate of taxation
authorized by current specific-model drug tax statutes.
The Court in Kurth Ranch also approved the levying of the tax as-
sessment in the same proceeding with the criminal offense.200 The
courts have repeatedly struck down double jeopardy claims when the
state seeks to impose the criminal sanction and the drug tax assess-
ment in the same proceeding.201 This result follows from the Supreme
Court's decision in Missouri v. Hunter.202 So long as both sanctions
are authorized by the legislature, these laws are free from multiple
punishment concerns and the Blockburger test is not controlling.203
Without doubt legislatures intend drug tax statutes to work in tandem
with the criminal law, since paying the tax does not provide criminalimmunity to the dealer.2 04 However, levying the criminal punishment
198. See Swyningan v. Commissioner, No. 4706, 1987 WL 25995 (Minn. Tax Ct. Dec.
7, 1987). In Swyningan, law enforcement authorities executed a search warrant
upon the defendant and seized $10,000 and a small bag of cocaine. The court
upheld the revenue department's assessment of $7,500 in unpaid income taxes
based upon a reconstruction of the defendant's drug-related income.
199. See People v. Queenan, 404 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1076 (1988); Greer v. Department of Treasury, 377 N.W.2d 836 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985). In Greer, the taxpayers were found in possession of twenty-seven
pounds of marijuana. Law enforcement officials also had knowledge of a previous
sale of fifteen pounds. To compute the sales tax, the revenue department calcu-
lated the assessment based on 243 pounds of marijuana, which included 200
pounds of "potential" sales. The appeals court upheld the resulting tax assess-
ment of $50,876. Similarly the court in Queenan upheld a revenue department
calculation amounting to over $2.1 million in unreported taxable sales. The cal-
culation was based upon 60 pounds of marijuana found in the possession of the
defendant and tax records seized by law enforcement authorities. People v. Quee-
nan, 404 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1076
(1988).
200. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994). See also
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).
201. See People v. Bolar, 588 N.E.2d 375, 377-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Butler,
505 N.W.2d, 806, 807-08 (Iowa 1993); State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 441-43
(Iowa 1993); State v. Berberich, 811 P.2d 1192, 1198 (Kan. 1991); Ex parte
Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
202. 459 U.S. 359 (1983). For a discussion of Hunter see supra notes 61-63 and accom-
panying text.
203. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450-51 (1989).
204. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-4308 (Reissue 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
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along with the civil punishment presents a variety of procedural
problems. Difficulties with determining the applicable burden of
prooi2O5 and the scope of discovery2O6 are likely to arise. Further-
more, the defendant in a criminal case has constitutional protections
not found in civil contexts, including the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the right to a jury trial, and the assistance of counsel.207
Nor is the state precluded from assessing the tax and foregoing
criminal remedy, or assessing the tax after the defendant has been
found not guilty in a criminal proceeding.208 As Kurth Ranch demon-
strates, the amount of these taxes can serve the objectives of the crim-
inal law. For example, failure to pay the tax in Nebraska can result in
the imposition of a Class IV felony209 that is punishable by up to five
years imprisonment and/or $10,000 fine.2 10 Such a sentence could
serve the state's interest in incarcerating the drug dealer, however al-
lowing the state to initiate a drug tax proceeding after a not guilty
criminal verdict has been rendered, would undermine the defendant's
finality interest.21 1 It has therefore been argued that an acquittal
should also bar future prosecutions in civil proceedings.212
Undoubtedly the states will continue to attempt to tap into the tax
base provided by the narcotics trade. Constitutional means exist for
states to do so. Already existing income and sales tax schemes provide
the most logical method. Simply amending the tax rate of current
drug tax schemes can accomplish the same result. On the other hand,
there is no reason to believe that state officials could not better coordi-
nate civil and criminal actions in order to avoid placing defendants in
double jeopardy.
V. CONCLUSION
As the regulatory nature of government continues to grow, viola-
tors of the criminal law are increasingly facing parallel civil sanctions
for the same conduct.2 13 Those who offend drug laws are no exception.
205. In criminal cases, the state is constitutionally required to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Civil mat-
ters require a lesser threshold of proof, often preponderance of the evidence.
206. Eads, supra note 72, at 979-83; Glickman, supra note 72, at 1280.
207. Cheh, supra note 72, at 1349.
208. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994). See also
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).
209. NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-4309 (Reissue 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
210. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105 (Reissue 1989).
211. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
212. See Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and
Prohibited Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989), 65 WAsH. L. Ruv. 437, 453-55
(1990).
213. Cheh, supra note 72, at 1325.
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Since civil procedures are not encumbered with the constitutional pro-
tections afforded criminal defendants, they are easier to use, more effi-
dent, and less costly than criminal prosecutions. 214 However, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that such tactics, if left
unchecked, could compromise the constitutional protection of double
jeopardy, particularly given the increasingly punitive nature of civil
sanctions. To resolve the tension between allowing all the constitu-
tional protections and compromising double jeopardy interests, the
Court crafted a rule extending double jeopardy protection only.
2 15
In Kurth Ranch, the Court cast a broad net that will catch most, if
not all, specific-model drug tax statutes. Where the Court in the past
has deferred to the legislature's intent to impose a civil sanction,
216
the Kurth Ranch majority refused to do so. Accordingly, unless the
state can demonstrate that the tax rate imposed is equivalent to the
rate imposed on legal goods and activities, the assessment operates in
a way very similar to the criminal law, and the Double Jeopardy
Clause affords the defendant constitutional protection. The unwilling-
ness of the Court to look the other way when the states enact drug tax
statutes reflects a healthy judicial antagonism toward revenue-raising
as a pretext for punishing drug-crime defendants twice for the same
offense.
Christian D. Stewart '96
214. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992).
215. Although the Kurth Ranch majority concludes the Montana drug assessment was
"the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution," Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994)(emphasis added), this lan-
guage should not be read to imply that all protections afforded to the criminal
defendant are applicable in civil proceedings. Kurth Ranch extended double jeop-
ardy protection only. As Justice Scalia correctly noted in his dissent, the stan-
dard for whether all criminal constitutional protections apply is substantially
different and less deferential than the standard articulated by Halper and Kurth
Ranch in the context of double jeopardy. Furthermore, if drug tax assessments
are criminal in nature, then such levies violate, not only double jeopardy, but all
of the criminal procedure guarantees regardless of whether the sanction was im-
posed in a prior criminal prosecution. Id. at 1959-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But
see id. at 1955 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)("[P]resumably the State cannot tax any-
one for possession of illegal drugs without providing the full panoply of criminal
procedure protections.").
216. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
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